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Economists have recently turned their attention to the effects of terrorism. One much 
debated effect of terrorist attacks is its impact on the results of democratic elections. To 
answer this question we use the terrorist attacks of the 11-M in Madrid as a natural 
experiment. We consider this particular case since the attack took place only three days 
before the 2004 Congressional Election, which allows the use of credible identification 
criterion. In particular, we use the advance voting by Spanish residents abroad, who cast 
their vote before the terrorist attack, to identify the effect of the bombing on the 
electoral result. We exploit this macabre natural experiment to run a difference-in-
differences estimation using data on three consecutive Congressional elections. Our 
empirical results indicate that a terrorist attack can have a large impact on the outcome 
of democratic elections.  
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Economists have recently focused some efforts on analyzing the effects of terrorism and 
terrorist attacks. The influence of 9/11 on the interest of economist for these issues is 
strong. Additionally, economists are also interested in explaining voting behaviour and 
predicting the results of elections using techniques alternative to the usual procedures 
based on polls.  
This paper is located in the crossing path of these two lines of research. One much 
debated effect of terrorist attacks is its impact on the results of democratic elections
1. 
To answer this question we use the terrorist attacks of the 11-M in Madrid as a natural 
experiment. A special characteristic of this terrorist attack is that took place only three 
days before the election date. The popular press has argued that the objective of the 
attack was to change the Spanish government since the incumbent party (conservative) 
had supported the war in Iraq while the contestant (socialist party) was opposed. In fact 
during the 2004 US presidential election there was a broadly shared fear that terrorists 
may tried to affect the election outcome by performing an attack. But, is it possible to 
find empirical evidence to support the claim that the terrorist attacks changed the 
identity of the winner of the 2004 Congressional election?  
Several studies, mostly by political scientists using post-electoral survey data, have tried 
to argue that the outcome of the Spanish congressional election of 2004 would have 
been the same even without the terrorist attack. However, economists do not trust this 
type of surveys and prefer to work with actual behaviour and not intentions or 
recollections.  
In general, it would be very difficult to evaluate properly the electoral effect of an 
episode like this. Economics and political science are two disciplines were researchers 
do not usually have the advantage of running experiments. This problem is particularly 
important in the analysis of electoral processes. For this reason we have chosen the 11-
M terrorist attack in Madrid. Since it took place so close to the election day, it is 
possible to find and count the actual votes of many voters that did not know about the 
terrorist attack: these group are the Spanish nationals abroad. Using this macabre natural 
                                                 
1 There were many political analysts predicting a terrorist attack during the 2004 US presidential election. 
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experiment we are able to identify the effect of the 11-M terrorist attack on the results of 
the Spanish election using two alternative approaches. 
The economic consequences of the change in the outcome of an election may be very 
important. In the Spanish case the winner of the election, the (contestant) socialist party, 
undertook many reforms with important economic effects: changes in the income and 
the enterprises tax codes, regularization of immigrant workers, changes in the structure 
of public expenditure, etc. These changes were not in the program of the incumbent 
(conservative) party.  
Finally, the issue of the impact of terrorist attack on elections is also important in the 
process of peace negotiations with terrorist groups. In the Spanish case, the socialist 
government initiated a difficult and controversial process of negotiation with the Basque 
terrorist group ETA with the opposition of the conservative party. If terrorist acts can 
change the outcome of elections, the closer the date of the election the higher would be 
the negotiation power of the terrorist group. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the recent literature on the effects 
of terrorism on the economy and recent contributions of economics to the explanation of 
voting. Section 3 describes the set-up of the case under study and discusses the 
application of the difference-in-differences methodology. Section 3 presents also a long 
list of robustness checks. Section 4 considers an alternative approach based on the 
transformation of the votes of nationals abroad into residents’ votes, which confirms 
also the findings of the previous section. Section 5 contains the basic conclusions. 
 
2. “Bombing” and “voting”: the economists’ perspective. 
 
In the past, the economic effect of civil wars and terrorism has been considered only 
exceptionally in the economics literature. This trend has changed dramatically in recent 
years. In our days, civil wars and armed conflicts are considered one of the most 
pervasive phenomena in the process of economic development (Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol 2005, Collier et al. 2003), although the identification of the direction of the 
causality between civil wars and development is complex. In fact, Miguel at al. (2004) 
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show that low economic growth increases the likelihood of civil wars using a sample of 
African countries and negative exogenous shocks
2.  
Economists have recognized for a long time that political instability, and therefore 
terrorism, increases uncertainty having an influence on economic growth
3 and the 
expected return to investment. Several papers have explored the economic impact of 
terrorism using cross-country or regional macro data. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) 
find that terrorism in the Basque Country produced a reduction of 10% in GDP per 
capita over two decades compared with a synthetic region without terrorism. They use a 
cease-fire period as a natural experiment to identify the effect of terrorism on the market 
value of Basque firms
4. More recently, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2006) have analyzed 
the effect of international terrorism on the net FDI position of countries. Their estimates 
indicate that an increase of one standard deviation in the intensity of terrorism implies a 
5 percent fall in the net FDI position of the country. 
Other papers take a microeconomic approach on the relationship between economics 
and terrorism. Angrist and Kugler (2005) analyze the connexion between the production 
of coca leaf and terrorism. They show that a shift in the production of coca paste from 
Peru and Bolivia to Colombia provided an exogenous increase in the demand for 
Colombian coca leaf, which produce localized gains in rural areas that did not spread to 
the rest of the country. The regions where coca production increased the most were, 
subsequently, the ones that became more violent. Angrist and Kugler (2005) interpret 
this finding as support for the theory that terrorism in Colombia is caused by the 
financial advantages of producing coca. On the methodological side Angrist and Kugler 
(2005) use a quasi-experiment based on the sharp change in the structure of the drug 
industry in Latin America caused by the increase in the interdiction by American and 
local authorities in non-Colombian countries in 1994. They divide the regions of 
Colombia into coca-growing and non-growing regions for the analysis, claiming that the 
cross-country analysis in unable to identify the effects. 
Miguel and Roland (2006) study the long run economic impact of the U.S. bombing of 
Vietnam. They compare the districts that were heavily bombed to other districts, 
                                                 
2 Abadie (2006) cannot find any significant relationship between terrorism and income after considering 
other characteristics of the countries. 
3 Mauro (1995) or Alesina et al. (1996). 
4 Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) find that Basque firms outperformed the control group during the truce 
period. 
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conditioning on demographic and geographic factors and find that the bombing did not 
have a robust negative impact on poverty rates, consumption or levels of literacy 
through 2002. Miguel and Roland (2006) use the distance to the 17
th parallel 
demilitarized zone as the instrumental variable to identify the impact of the bombing. 
Economists have not only being interested on “bombings”. We have also being 
interested on “voting”. The traditional approach of the empirical literature deals with the 
ability of economic models, variables and techniques to forecast election results. Leigh 
and Wolfers (2006) provide a recent summary of alternative approaches to forecasting 
elections using the economist’s toolkit. In particular, Leigh and Wolfers (2006) show 
that the performance of polls is uneven and vary too much to be useful. They argue that 
predictive markets, based on bets by individuals, provide useful forecasts with a 
reasonable degree of volatility. These results point in the traditional direction of 
economics research: we should trust only actual behaviour and not opinions in polls.   
Recently, Mullainathan and Washington (2006) have analyzed the causal direction 
between votes and beliefs. The traditional view points out that beliefs and preferences 
influence vote. However, psychologists have recognized for a long time the possibility 
that actions (voting) can drive preferences and beliefs: a vote for a particular candidate 
may lead to a favourable interpretation of her actions. Therefore, as in the cases 
discussed previously, there maybe an important issue of endogeneity between voter’s 
choice and preferences. Mullainathan and Washington (2006) use the Presidential 
election to analyze this issue. They use as exogenous factors the age of the voter and the 
timing of the election. Their methodological approach is based on a version of the 
regression discontinuity design that uses the fact that only individual that reach their 
18
th birthday by the date of the election are eligible to vote. The regression is basically a 
difference-in-differences specification. Using this approach Mullainathan and 
Washington (2006) find support for the cognitive dissonance of voting behaviour and, 
therefore, for the incumbency advantage. These results show also the problems 
generated by using post-electoral polls when trying to analyze the preferences of voters 
prior to the election
5.  Lee et al. (2004) use a quasi-experiment to analyze whether voter 
can affect the policy choices of politicians or they just elect policies. They use as 
exogenous shocks the change in electoral strength. The electoral rules of the US 
                                                 
5 Post-electoral polls are the basic data for the justification of the victory of the socialist party in the 
Spanish case even under the counterfactual situation of no terrorist attack. 
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Congressional electoral system generate a close to random assignment of which party 
holds a seat in close elections. As in the previous case this is a version of the regression 
discontinuity design approach.  The assumption is that a close election (the incumbent 
barely won the previous election) is the same no matter if the district is Democratic or 
Republican. Lee et al. (2004) analyze the effect of close elections on subsequent 
representatives’ roll-call voting records and find that electors vote policies and do not 
seem to affect their Representatives’ choices during general elections. 
For the purposes of our study there is a relevant paper on the intersection of “bombing” 
and “voting”. Karol and Miguel (2005) analyze the effect that Iraq War casualties had 
on the 2004 Presidential election. They show that the 10.000 US dead and wounded in 
Iraq reduced in 2 percent the popular vote of George W. Bush in the 2004 Presidential 
election. More interestingly, Karol and Miguel (2005) find that the results after 
eliminating the effect of US casualties in Iraq would have been close to the predictions 
of statistical models that did not consider the impact of the war. 
In the following section we analyze the effect of the 11M terrorist attack and the 
counterfactual results of the Spanish Congressional election of 2004 if there had been 
no terrorist attack three days before the election date. 
 
3. Voting after the bombing. 
 
In this paper we use study the effect of terrorist attack on the results of democratic 
elections. For this purposes we use the 11-M terrorist attack on Madrid because it can 
be considered as a suitable natural experiment given the particular timing of events that 
took place around the election date. This is the sequence of events that led to the 2004 
Spanish Congressional election. 
March 2003. President Bush decides the invasion of Iraq. The President of the Spanish 
Government, Mr. Aznar (from the conservative party) joins the US in the war 
against terrorism in Iraq as part of the international coalition. 
October 18, 2003. Bin Laden sends a message in Al Yazeera: “We have the right to 
retaliate whenever and wherever we believe it is adequate against the countries 
involved in the international coalition against Iraq, specially United Kingdom, 
Spain, Australia, Poland, Italy and Japan”.  
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March 11, 2004 (30 months after 9/11). Islamic terrorists deposit nine backpacks full of 
explosive in several trains in Madrid. The explosions kill 191 people and wound 
1,500.  
March 14, 2004. Spanish Congressional election date. Unexpectedly, the socialist party 
wins the election. 
Initially, after the terrorist attack, the conservative government pointed in the direction 
of ETA, the Basque separatist group that seeks the independence of the Basque country, 
as the author of the attack. However, very soon there were many hints in the direction of 
radical Islamic groups. Despite these hints the government continued arguing that ETA 
was, most likely, responsible for the killing. By the afternoon of the 13th of March, it 
was already quite clear that the attack was executed by an Islamic terrorist group. 
Was the terrorist attack the cause of the defeat of the incumbent conservative party? 
Some political scientists have given a negative answer, using post-electoral polls. 
However, polls taken before the election date showed a clear victory for the incumbent. 
Table 1 shows that the average percentage of vote for the conservative was around 42-
43% in the months previous to the election
6. These simple statistics show an important 
difference in the polls in favour of the conservative party
7 at least until the 7
th of March.  
 
Table 1. Monthly average proportions of votes across different polls. 
  % Conservative % Socialist Difference
January 42.92%  36.32%  6.60 
February 42.90%  36.35%  6.55 
March 42.36%  37.60%  4.76 
Election March 14  37.71%  42.59%  -4.88 
Source: Several sources. 
 
Since Table 1 shows an average of proportions coming from many different sources 
(basically polls paid by pro-conservative or pro-socialist mass media
8) the figures may 
be subject to bias. However Figure 1, which comes from a homogeneous source (the 
Gallup survey) shows a similar picture of the voting intention of Spanish electors. 
                                                 
6 The averages are taken over five polls in January, ten in February and seven in March.  
7 In fact as late as the 7
th of March the basic question in the mass media was if the conservative party 
would be able to obtain the absolute majority.   
8 Recently economists have considered the influence of mass media on the outcome of elections. For 
instance, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2006) discuss the impact of Fox News in the Presidential elections 
between 1996 and 2000. 
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Figure 1, as Table 1, does not show any trend in the months previous to the election 
(March 2004). If anything, it seems that the conservative party was gaining some 
momentum during February 2004. In fact, the last poll of Gallup shows that 44 percent 
of the voters were planning to vote for the conservative party. 
[Insert figure 1 around here] 
Most of the negative answers come from the use of post-electoral polls. Lago and 
Montero (2005) use intensively a post-electoral survey by Demoscopia and argue that 
the terrorist attack did not have any significant impact on the result of the election. Lago 
and Montero (2005) estimate a logit model, using the individual microdata of 
Demoscopia, for the probability of voting for the conservative party versus the socialist 
party
9. Based on these estimations they construct a counterfactual simulation under the 
assumption that some of the explanatory variables in the logit model (for instance the 
answer to the question “Was the terrorist attack the result of the political position of the 
conservative party?”) were equal to 0 even when the answer was affirmative.  They 
argue that using this strategy it is possible to evaluate the counterfactual situation were 
nobody thought that the attack was the result of the policy of the Government, or 
nobody was influenced by the informative policy of the Government, or both hypothesis 
simultaneously. Assuming that nobody thought that the conservative Government was 
at least partly responsible for the attacks, nor it tried in purpose a confusing informative 
policy, the socialist party would have lost 3.5 percentage points while the conservative 
party would have won 1.2 percentage points
10. Therefore, Lago and Montero (2005) 
conclude that the incidence of the terrorist attack was very limited. 
However, these results are biased by many factors. The estimation of the logit models is 
plagued by many endogenous variables that are assumed exogenous. The sample of 
Demoscopia is clearly biased since it grossly under represents the voters for the 
conservative party. In the survey there are almost 2 voters of the Socialist party for each 
voter of the conservative party when, in the actual election, there were only 1.12. In 
addition, being a post-electoral survey asking for the reasons why voters change their 
vote after the bombing, the answers are plagued with all the problems associated with 
retrospective questions and cognitive dissonance. In this particular case, the problems 
are much more important since the terrorist attack, which is the event being analyzed, 
                                                 
9 They use the 50 percent threshold to assign a vote. 
10 The difference would have gone mostly to the communist party. 
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could have a critical impact in the recollection/perception of what voters thought before 
the attack.   
 
3.1. Analyzing the counterfactual: the identification strategy 
 
In general, the issues related with political elections are difficult to analyze with the 
usual tools of econometrics because of endogeneity problems. In section 2 we show that 
the problem of endogeneity is present in all the literature on “bombing” and “voting”. 
For this reason our identification strategy relies on a natural experiment
11. The 
particular case we analyze in this paper is a very special situation because of the timing 
of the terrorist attack and the deadlines for the voting of Spanish nationals living in 
foreign countries. This timing generates a macabre natural experimental, which relies 
only on observed voting behaviour, without any reference to opinion polls (neither pre-
electoral, nor post-electoral). The presential voters, who cast their vote the 14th of 
March, obviously knew about the terrorist attack. However, there is a body of electors 
who voted before the election date. The Spanish legislation calls them “absentee 
voters”
12. In many countries the regulation imposes a deadline for the vote of the 
citizens abroad, which is several days before the official day of the election.  
Notice that we are not referring to mail voters in general. The non-presential vote by 
residents in Spain
13 cannot be differentiated from the presential vote because it is 
introduced in the same urn. The “absentee voters” are non-presential voters who live in 
a foreign country and are registered in a Spanish consulate. The electoral rules for 
absentee voting in the 2004 Elections allowed them to vote before the day of the 
bombing. In particular, they could start voting from the 2
nd of March
14 with two 
possible options: to cast their vote in person before the 7
th of March in a Spanish 
Consulate or by certified mail. We can use two groups, the Spanish residents and the 
Spanish nationals abroad, to evaluate the effect of the terrorist attack on the results of 
                                                 
11 For a clarifying discussion on the differences between experiments, quasi-experiments and natural 
experiments see Meyer (1995) or Shadish et al. (2002). 
12 In Spain these voters are counted in the CERA (Census of Absentee Voters Resident Abroad). These 
persons are basically Spanish nationals with right to vote who are living in foreign countries and who are 
registered in the Spanish Consulates around the world.  
13 Mail voters who live in Spain, but for some reason, are not going to be in their electoral district the day 
of the election. In strict sense these voters are also “absentee voters” but they are not included in the 
CERA because their official residence is a Spanish address. 
14 A caveat we discuss in the section 3.5 is the possibility of other important news (apart from the terrorist 
attack) that changed the intention of vote of electors between the 2
nd of March and the election date. 
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the election. Using the terminology of causal inference we have two groups: the treated 
group is the set of voters resident in Spain, who where subject to the treatment 
(information about the terrorist attack) before they vote; and the control group, which is 
formed by the absentee voting of Spanish national abroad, who did not know about the 
terrorist attack before they cast their vote.  For both groups we have the results of three 
Congressional elections. This set up allows the use the difference-in-differences (DID) 
methodology to evaluate the impact of the terrorist attack. The standard DID estimator, 
in non-parametric form, is 
[] [ []
[] [ [ 0 , 0 | 1 , 0 |
0 , 1 | 1 , 1 |
= = − = = −
]
] ]
= = − = = =
D G Y E D G Y E
D G Y E D G Y E δ
    ( 1 )     
where Y is the outcome variable (percentage of vote cast for the conservative party), D 
is a time dummy variable (D=0 if the time period is before the terrorist attack and D=1 
if it is after) and G is a dummy variable that denotes the group (G=0 if the observation 
belong to the control group and G=1 if it belong to the treatment group). 
A sufficient condition for the identification of the treatment effect is that the selection 
for treatment does not depend on the individual-transitory perturbation of the primitive 
specification. This is to say that, in the absence of treatment, the average outcome for 
the treated and the untreated would have presented the same change
15. If we have a 
sample with repeated pre-treatment and post-treatment observation for the outcome 
variable we can estimate the difference-in-differences estimator, δ using a regression 
formulation 
it i t it u G D Y + + = Δ δ β1       ( 2 )  
If we have data on more than two periods and the specification in levels includes a time 
trend with a time specific coefficient
16 then the regression (2) should include a dummy 
variable for each new time period. 
There has been a growing interest for this type of estimators in the empirical economic 
literature. Bertrand et al. (2004) found 92 papers that use the difference-in-differences 
approach written between 1990 and 2000 in a selected set of journals. Many of these 
applications refer to labor economics although there have been applications in many 
                                                 
15 This is also referred to as the parallelism assumption. 
16 See Ashenfelter and Card (1985) or Abadie (2005). 
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other fields
17. Recently, several authors have proposed extensions to the basic linear 
parametric specification. Athey and Imbens (2006) proposed an identification strategy 
for non-linear difference-in differences model that includes the standard DID as a 
particular case. Bertrand et al (2004) notice that the inconsistency of standard errors 
when outcomes are serially correlated and data are individual (not grouped), could 
generate a severe understatement of their value. They propose two corrections based on 
grouping in the time and the cross section dimensions. Donald and Lang (2004) discuss 
inference in panel data when the number of groups is small (typical of DID estimation) 
and some variables are group specific. Conley and Taber (2004) provide a new method 
of inference in DID models when there are a small number of policy changes. 
In some situations the dynamics of the outcome variable may depend on covariates. 
This is more likely the more unbalanced are the covariates between groups. If this is the 
case, the difference-in-differences estimator (1) could be written analogously but 





jit j i t it u X G D Y + + + = Δ ∑γ δ β1       ( 3 )  
 
3.2. Data and basic results 
 
Our data contains 52 observations for each time period for the treated group (Spanish 
residents) and the control group (Spanish citizens in a foreign country). These 
observations correspond to the results of the Congressional elections of 1993, 1996, 
2000 and 2004
19 in each of the 50 provinces of Spain plus the two Spanish cities in 
Africa (Ceuta and Melilla)
20. All the data are taken from the database of the Spanish 
Secretary of Homeland Security (Ministerio del Interior). The electoral census is 
divided in two parts: the regular census and the census of “residents absent”, or voters 
                                                 
17 A basic reference for the estimation of linear difference-in-differences models is Blundell and 
MaCurdy (2000). 
18 Abadie (2005) has recently proposed a semiparametric approach to the estimation of difference-in-
differences models with covariates. See also the related work by Heckman et al. (1998). 
19 Notice that we only consider Congressional elections since it is well-known that the choices of voters in 
other type of elections (local, regional or European) is significantly different. 
20 Ceuta and Melilla have a special status since from an administrative point of view they are cities, 
provinces and Autonomous Communities. They are located in the Northern coast of Africa. Given their 
population and ethnic mix these two cities are quite different from the rest of Spain. 
  11Voting after the bombing 
 
who have registered in a Spanish consulate because they live abroad (CERA or Census 
of “Absent Residents”)
21.  
Our specification includes also several covariates. The use of additional regressors can 
improve the efficiency of the estimation. In addition, by including these covariates we 
can deal with compositional differences between the treated and the control group 
caused by potential failures in the parallelism hypothesis. Therefore, the variables 
included in X control for potential differences in the outcome distributional dynamics. 
There are two basic covariates: the number of voters and the participation rate. Table 2 
presents the results of the following specification, using these Congressional elections 
it it it it t t it u POTVOT PART DG D D Y + + + + + + = Δ − 2 1 1 3 2 1 04 00 λ λ δ β β β    (4) 
where the outcome ΔY is the change in the proportion of vote for the incumbent 
(conservative) party, D04 and D00 are two time dummies, and DGit is the interaction 
term that represents the resident voters after the terrorist attack (treated group after the 
treatment was received). We consider two covariates related with the level of the 
participation rate and the number of potential voters. Since the covariates have to be 
predetermined at the initial time we use the lag of the participation rate (PART)
22. The 
number of potential voters (POTVOT) was unaffected by the terrorist attack since the 
electoral lists are constructed before the beginning of the election period. 
[Insert table 2 around here] 
Table 2 presents the estimation of the basic specification. All the regressions show a 
highly significant reduction in the proportion of voters for the incumbent (conservative) 
party as a consequence of the terrorist attack. The direct interpretation of the coefficient 
on DG as the effect of the terrorist attack on the proportion of vote of the incumbent 
party is not totally adequate since the provinces do not have the same number of voters. 
Then, the effect on the average proportion of provincial voters for the incumbent party 
could not represent appropriately the overall proportion for the whole country. We need 
to construct the counterfactual number of votes for the incumbent (conservative) party if 
there had not been a terrorist attack. For this purpose we predict the proportion of votes 
for the conservative party in each province if there had been no bombing and multiply 
                                                 
21 Notice that the total number of voters includes the votes of the residents absent in the CERA. For this 
reason the numbers presented in the following sections are not identical to the ones reported in Colomer 
(2005), which do not include the votes of residents absent. Including the previous Congressional elections 
(like 1993) does not affect the basic findings presented in the paper.  
22 The participation rate was also affected by the terrorist attack as we discuss later in the paper. 
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this by the number of potential voters times the counterfactual participation rate of each 
province. Notice that the participation rate was also affected by the terrorist attack. 
Therefore, we consider that possibility and we estimate the “no bombing” participation 
rate. To obtain this objective we run a DID estimator on the participation rate by 
provinces with the results shown below 
it t it DG D RT A P ) 66 . 3 ( 73 . 2 00 ) 78 . 17 ( 39 . 9 5(6.12)D04 9 . 3 ) 91 . 1 ( 71 . 0 ˆ
t + − + − − = Δ  (5) 
where the t-statistic is included between parenthesis
23. The R
2 of this regression is 0.78. 
The estimation shows that the bombing had a positive effect, increasing the average 
provincial participation rate in 2.7 percentage points. Using the predicted participation 
rate and the predicted proportion of vote for the conservative party under the 
counterfactual situation, the specification in column 1 of table 2 delivers a 42.8% of the 
counterfactual voters for the incumbent (conservative) party. This proportion is almost 
identical to the results of the polls during March of 2004
24. 
Column 2 in Table 2 includes the lagged participation rate as an additional explanatory 
variable. The results are very similar to the ones obtained in column 1. The treatment 
effect of the terrorist attack is negative and highly significant. Under the counterfactual 
situation the incumbent (conservative) party would have received the support of 42.5% 
of the counterfactual voters. Columns 3 to 6 include additional covariates: the lagged 
participation rate for the treated group (column 3), the number of potential voters 
(column 4), the combination of potential voter and lagged participation rate, total and 
for the treated group (column 5). Column 6 considers jointly all the previous covariates. 
The R
2 in the regression with covariates reaches 0.56. 
No matter what set of covariates we use, the counterfactual vote for the incumbent party 
oscillates between 42.4% and 42.8%, close to the results predicted by the polls taken 
before the terrorist attack. This means that the terrorist attack reduced in approximately 
5 percentage points the support for the incumbent party. 
[Insert table 3 around here] 
Among the observations (provinces) included in the sample there are two potential 
outliers: Ceuta and Melilla. These are the last two colonial cities that Spain keeps in the 
North of Africa. Given their population and ethnic mix these two cities are quite 
                                                 
23 In all the regressions presented in the paper we have computed a HAC, or robust, estimator of the 
standard deviation, using the typical sandwich formula. 
24 See table 1. 
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different from the rest of Spain. They also have a low number of potential voters and, 
since we are running un-weighted regressions, they could affect the aggregate result 
even if we control for the number of voters as a covariate. Table 3 replicates the 
specifications in Table 2 but without including these provinces. All the regressions 
show an effect of the terrorist attack a little higher than in Table 2. The coefficient 
ranges between -5.29 and -5.60 while in Table 2 the range of variation was between -
4.90 and -5.29. We can use the procedure discussed before to calculate the number of 
voters for the incumbent (conservative) party under the no terrorist attack 
counterfactual, correcting also the participation rate by province. The DID estimation of 
the participation rate equation is practically identical to the results presented in (5). In 
particular, the estimated coefficient for the treatment dummy is 2.6. The estimations in 
Table 3 imply a counterfactual proportion of votes for the incumbent (conservative) 
between 42.9% and 43.1%. The R
2 has increased (0.62) with respect to the regression 
that included all the observations (0.56). Following the results in Table 3 the terrorist 
attack reduced the proportion of voters for the incumbent party by approximately 5.4 
percentage points.  
 
3.3. Weighted regressions 
 
Table 2 and 3 present the results of the counterfactual (no terrorist attack) aggregating to 
the national level the results obtained at the provincial level using province specific 
potential voters and participation rates. However, the regressions are estimated using as 
observations the outcomes of provinces that have a very different number of potential 
voters. In this section we re-estimate the specifications of Tables 2 and 3, weighting 
each observation by the potential number of voter. Table 4 replicates the specifications 
of Table 2 but weighting the observations by the number of potential voters in each 
province. Column 1 presents the basic specification. The weighted regressions increase 
the impact of the terrorist attack on the proportion of vote for the incumbent party. In 
particular, column 1 shows that the terrorist attack reduced the electoral support for the 
incumbent party in 7.5 percentage points. Columns 2 to 6 include the same regressions 
of Table 1 but weighting the observations by the number of potential voters. The results 
indicate a clear increase in the effect of the terrorist attack on the electoral support of the 
incumbent (conservative) party with respect to the results of the unweighted regressions 
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of Table 2. The R
2 is around 0.8. The average reduction in the proportion of votes for 
the incumbent party is around 7.2 percentage points while in Table 2 the average effect 
was around 5.1 percentage points. 
[Insert table 4 around here] 
Table 4 includes all the provinces in the regressions. However, as we discussed in 
section 3.2, there are two observations that are potentially outliers: the two African 
cities of Ceuta and Melilla. It is reasonable to expect that eliminating these observations 
in a weighted regression will have less of an impact than in the case of the unweighted 
regression. Table 5 present the results of the weighted regressions excluding these two 
potential outliers. Column 1 confirms that the effect of eliminating these observations is 
very small. The increase in the coefficient on the treatment effect is 0.1%, while the 
effect in column 1 of table 3 (unweighted regressions without outliers) is an increase of 
5.6%. Something similar happens in the rest of the regressions. As in table 3, the 
elimination of these observations increases the absolute value of the coefficient of the 
treatment variable but, in the case of the weighted regressions, the proportional increase 
(around 1.8%) is smaller than in Table 3 (around 7.5%). Finally, the R
2 has also 
increased (0.82) with respect to the weighted regressions with the full sample but the 
influence of the elimination of the outliers in the improvement of the fit of the 
regressions is not as large as in the case of the unweighted regressions.  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
As an additional robustness test, we consider running the weighted regressions with 
three Congressional (two cross-sectional changes). The results in the previous tables 
include data on three changes. Bertrand et al (2004) recommend collapsing the data into 
a pre- and post- treatment period to obtain consistent estimates of the standard errors 
when the number of aggregated observations is small. Following their suggestion, and 
the standard of many applications, we discuss in this section the sensitivity of the results 
to the use of only differences in Congressional elections (1996 to 2000 and 2000 to 
2004).  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
Column 1 of Table 6 shows the estimation of the basic regression. In this case the 
terrorist attack reduced the proportion of vote for the conservative party in 7.5 
percentage points. This estimator is almost identical to the one obtained for the basic 
regression with three Congressional elections (columns 1 in Tables 4 and 5). Column 2 
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includes the lagged participation rate as a covariate, while column 3 adds also the 
number of potential voters. The estimation of the effect of the terrorist attack ranges 
between -6.9 and -7.5 percentage points. The R
2 is 0.86 in the last regression, higher 
than the corresponding coefficient of determination in column 4 of table 4 (0.80) where 
the estimation included three Congressional elections. 
The last three columns of Table 6 present the weighted regressions using two 
Congressional elections but eliminating the potential outliers (Ceuta and Melilla). The 
effect of the terrorist attack is very similar to the one obtained in the initial three 
columns. The absolute value of the coefficient increases when the outliers are 
eliminated, as we already reported in the case of the weighted and unweighted 
regressions with data on three Congressional elections. However, the difference in the 
coefficient is very small, as we observed in the comparison of the weighted regressions 
of Table 5 with Table 4. The R
2 increases marginally when the outliers are not included 
in the sample, in agreement with the results reported in previous sections.   
 
3.4. Discussion of the results 
 
The results of the DID estimation presented in the previous subsection are robust to 
different specifications, samples and weights of the observations. The terrorist attack 
had a significantly negative effect on the electoral support of the incumbent 
(conservative) party in the 2004 Congressional election. The estimation of the treatment 
effect is always negative and statistically significant, no matter what specification is 
used. The estimated counterfactual percentage of votes for the conservative party 
ranges, depending on the specification, between 42.5% and 45%. The lower bound of 
the range is similar to the average of the polls presented in Table 1 while the upper 
bound corresponds closely to the latest Gallup poll presented in Figure 1. 
In this section we discuss the interpretation of these findings and some possible threats 
to their validity.  First of all, the results should be interpreted as a molar descriptive 
causation in the terminology of Shadish et al. (2002)
25, by contrast with a molecular 
interpretation. Many researchers have argued that the terrorist attack was only a small 
part of the reason why the incumbent (conservative) party lost the election. These 
authors argue that the informative treatment of the terrorist attack by the Government 
                                                 
25 See pages 10 and 54. 
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was more important than the attack “per se”. Following this interpretation, voters felt 
deceived by the attempt of the Government to make ETA, the Basque terrorist group, 
responsible of the attack even after they got clear hints that an Islamic terrorist group 
was the most likely suspect. We interpret our results as molar because we cannot 
identify separately the effect of the terrorist attack in its multiple molecular elements 
(the attack “per se”, the informative policy of the Government, the effect of watching in 
TV the concentration of people in front of the headquarters of the conservative party, 
etc.). We consider the effect of the terrorist attack as a complex package that includes 
all the previously cited components. We believe that it is impossible to discern the 
effect of each of the components using data on actual voting. In addition, the terrorist 
attack is the reason why there were attempts to mislead public opinion about the identity 
of the perpetrators. The Government thought that accusing the Basque separatists would 
produce some electoral return (since the conservative party represented the tough 
approach towards the Basque problem). On the other hand, accusing an Islamic group 
had negative consequences on their electoral prospects. In any case the terrorist attack 
was a necessary condition for what happen afterwards. Therefore, the results can be 
safely interpreted as the consequence of the terrorist attack in a molar causal approach. 
Secondly, we should discuss some possible threats to the internal validity of the 
findings. Basically, we want to distinguish between possible and plausible, or likely, 
threats for the particular case under study. Shadish et al. (2002) provide the standard 
classification of these potential problems. They classify the threats to the validity of the 
findings in natural experiments and quasi-experiments in three groups: statistical 
validity, internal validity and external validity
26. At the beginning of this section we 
discussed the robustness of the basic results to alternative specifications and data 
structures. Even in the lower bound of the counterfactual, the proportion of votes for the 
incumbent (conservative) party is 42.5%, while the actual proportion was 37.4%. 
Therefore, the findings are substantive
27 and statistically robust.  
                                                 
26 We do not consider external validity since it is unlikely that a situation like the one considered in this 
paper could happen again, although there were indications that a terrorist attack could had happened 
during the US Presidential election of 2004.  
27 The socialist party won the election, and the presidency of the Government, with a percentage of votes 
similar to our estimated counterfactual (no terrorist attack) proportion for the conservative party. 
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Are there plausible threats to the internal validity of these results? Are there reasons to 
believe that the data cannot be treated as a natural experiment
28? Meyer (1995) and 
Shadish et al. (2002)
29 describe a full list of threats to internal validity. Some of them do 
not apply to our case. For instance, the first item in the list is an ambiguous temporal 
precedence between the assumed cause and the effect. However, in the episode that we 
are analyzing it is clear that some voters cast their vote after knowing about the terrorist 
attack and some others did not know
30. Among the possible threats we can include 
selection and history.  
We believe there is no sample selection, since the decisions of Spaniards to live outside 
of Spain was not caused by the terrorist attack. In fact, Spanish residents in foreign 
countries had to be listed in the electoral Census of “residents absent” well before the 
attack took place. It is true that Al-Qaeda had threaten Spain with terrorist attacks but it 
is unlikely that any individual would have taken her decision of residence outside of 
Spain because of this. It would be possible that the Spaniards who migrated to other 
countries between 2000 and 2004 had a conservative bias. However, this is not very 
likely. The conservative party was in power during these years and, therefore, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the policies and measures adopted by the Government 
favoured specially their conservative voters. Additionally, in many specifications we 
include some covariates to control for this possibility without altering the basic findings.  
The possibility of Spanish nationals abroad to handle their vote since the second of 
March, while the terrorist attack was on the 11
th, could also be a source of threats to the 
internal validity of the results
31. If there were negative news about the incumbent 
(conservative) party, or positive about the contestant (socialist) party, between the 
second of March and the terrorist attack, then the treatment effect estimated previously 
could not be attributed totally to the terrorist attack. We have checked the best selling 
newspapers of Spain
32 during the period between the second of March and the 11
th 
                                                 
28 Obviously, in our case the cause is not manipulable and, therefore, it cannot be considered as an 
experimental study. Nevertheless, the particular timing of the events generates a sort of randomization in 
the reception or not of information about the terrorist attack.  
29 Page 55. 
30 Other possible problems that do not apply are attrition, failure to follow the protocol and experimental 
effects. 
31 This is called history in the terminology of Shadish et al. (2002), or the possibility that events occurring 
concurrently to the treatment could cause the observed effect. 
32 We included all the newspapers with a net circulation daily average over 100,000 copies (except sport 
newspapers). The list includes the ABC (278,000), El Correo (124,999), El Mundo (314,000), El País 
(453,000), El Periódico (170,000), La Razón (140,000) y La Vanguardia (208,000). Source: OJD. 
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searching for negative news about the conservative party (corruption scandals, 
worsening of the prospects of victory in the Congressional election, etc.). There are 
many news related with the two largest political parties (conservative and socialist). We 
analyze more than 200 news during the period. However, we were unable to find any 
clear bias of the news pro- or against the conservative party. The fact that there were not 
important news during the period, that almost every newspaper has a clear bias pro- or 
against one of the two largest parties and that the circulation of newspapers favouring 
each option is quite balance can explain this absence of aggregated bias over the period 
and the set of chosen newspapers
33.   
 
4. A transformation approach. 
 
In this section we analyze an alternative specification to tackle the issue of evaluating 
the counterfactual percentage of votes for the conservative party under the “no attack” 
situation. We use basically the same data of section 3. We should notice that in our 
sample the same provinces are included in the treated and control group in each 
Congressional election. Obviously the voters are different since both groups are 
exclusive: the treated group is composed by presential voters while the untreated group 
includes only residents abroad. Nevertheless, province 1 is counted twice: into the 
treated group (for the residents in province 1) and into the non-treated group (for the 
residents abroad who were residents of province 1 when they lived in Spain). Therefore, 
it would be reasonable to think that there is a province specific component that affects 
individuals of province 1 included in both groups (treated and untreated) since the initial 
pool of residents in province 1 is the same.  
In this section we consider that there is a stable relationship across provinces between 
the vote of resident in Spain and Spanish nationals abroad. We proposed a specification 
that represents the transformation of votes of Spanish citizens in a foreign country into 
presential votes. Empirically, there is a positive and quite robust relationship between 
the proportion of voters resident in Spain and the vote of Spanish nationals abroad for 
each political party at the province level. Figure 2 shows, by year, the relationship 
                                                                                                                                               
(Institutional Supervisor of circulation in written mass media). Net circulation daily average between 
parenthesis.  
33 We also checked the same for the 1996 and 2000 Congressional elections without finding any 
significant event. 
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between the percentage of voters of the socialist party among Spanish nationals abroad 
and the voters for the socialist party among the citizens resident in Spain. Figure 2 
shows that the relationship is quite stable until 2004. In this year the graphs shows that 
it was “cheaper” to get a high proportion of vote of residents for the socialist party in 
terms of the votes of the Spanish nationals abroad. This is to say that with less votes 
from Spanish nationals abroad than in previous elections, the socialist party achieved a 
higher percentage of votes in the regular election (residents in Spain). Figure 3 shows 
the same graphs for the case of the conservative party. In this case the figure for 2004 
shows the opposite result. 
 
[Figures 2 and 3 around here] 
 
Therefore, we are interested in the change of the slope of the relationship between the 
votes by residents and Spanish nationals abroad that happen as a consequence of the 
terrorist attack. It is reasonable to think that there is unobserved heterogeneity at the 
level of the provinces. Since this unobserved effect could be correlated with the random 
perturbation, the pooled OLS regression will lead to biased and inconsistent estimators. 











it u AV D AV TV + + + = δ β α  
 
where TV is the number of votes for party P of residents, AV are the votes for party P 
of Spanish nationals abroad and D is a dummy variable which take value 1 in the 
election when the terrorist attack took place (2004)
34. The index P represents the 
political party, i represents provinces and the index t is the time indicator. This 
specification implies a province specific intercept for each political party and province. 
The basic assumption to identify the effect of the terrorist attack on voting is the strict 
exogeneity of the regressors 





P AV AV D u E α  
                                                 
34 The results are unaffected by the inclusion of another explanatory variable which controls for the 












it AV D AV D AV TV ε γ δ β α + + + + = 2000  
since the coefficient of the coefficient turns out to be not significantly different from 0. Results under 
request. 
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where ui=(ui1,…, uiT) and AVi=(AVi1, …, AViT) corresponding to the T periods 
included. In the case under consideration this assumption is likely to hold since the 
terrorist attack was unexpected and the voting of the Spanish nationals abroad was cast 
before the attack took place. The coefficient δ measures the change in the sensitivity of 
the votes of residents with respect to the votes of Spanish nationals abroad.  The basic 
hypothesis is that the terrorist attack reduced the votes of the conservative party (PP) 
and increased the votes of the socialist party (PSOE), which took a large part of the 
increase from the communist party (IU)
35. If the terrorist attack had an influence in the 
results of the election then we should find that δ
PP (conservative party) and δ
IU 
(communist party) are negative while δ
PSOE (socialist party) is positive.  
 
 
Table 6: Results of the estimation of the transformation model. 
 Conservative  (PP)  Socialist (PSOE)  Communist (IU) 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
β 5.68  2.81 22.47 2.34 437.08  10.37
δ -3.66  -3.43 13.31 4.24 -130.57  -10.07
F(2,112) 5.96  p=0.00 51.63 p=0.00 72.98  p=0.00
F(51,102) 524.9  p=0.00 56.52 p=0.00 2.8  p=0.00
 
Table 6 presents the results of the estimation together with several specification tests. 
The estimation shows that, based on the vote by Spanish nationals abroad, it is more 
“expensive” each vote for the conservative party than for the socialist party. Since we 
allow each party to have a different slope we can check the size of the difference. Table 
6 also provides evidence that confirms the basic hypothesis: the coefficient δ is negative 
and statistically significant in both, the case of the conservative party and the 
communist party. By the contrary, the coefficient for the socialist party is positive and 
also statistically significant. The ratio of the variance of the individual effects with 
respect to the idiosyncratic variance shows that most of the variability is due to the first 
(the province specific component). The test for the joint significance of the slopes 
(F(2,112)) rejects the null hypothesis that both are jointly equal to 0. Finally the joint 
                                                 
35 We are going to use the name “communist” to refer in English to the basic ideology of Izquierda Unida 
(IU) although this is not totally correct. IU is a federation of parties with different ideologies. However, 
the fact that most of the political parties in the federation are to the left of the socialist party and the 
importance of the communist party in the coalition makes it reasonable to include all of them under the 
“communist” umbrella.  
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test for the statistical significance of the intercepts (F(51,102)) rejects the null 
hypothesis that all are jointly equal to 0.  
Using the estimations in table 6 we can construct the counterfactual of what would had 
happened if the terrorist attack would not have taken place. For this purpose we have to 
calculate the fitted values for the total number of votes for each party in 2004 assuming 
that δ=0. Table 7 shows the comparison of the actual votes in the 2004 election and the 
counterfactual calculation. The results of the counterfactual show proportions similar to 
the polls taken days before the terrorist attack. The conservative party would have got a 
bit less than the prediction of the polls while the socialist party would have been around 
the same value. Using these numbers we can conclude that the bombing reduced the 
number of votes to the conservative party by 563,061 and increase the votes of the 
socialist party by 1,768,979. On the other hand, the communist party lost 1,195,627 
votes. The total number of votes increased by 1,113,674 voters. 
 
Table 7. Number of voters for each political party: actual and counterfactual  
(Main national political parties) 
 2004  %  Counterfactual 
PP 9,763,144  37.71% 10,326,195 41.24%
PSOE 11,026,163  42.59% 9,257,184 36.97%
IU 1,324,135  4.96% 2,519,762 10.06%
Total* 25,891,299  24,777,625
* Total= total number of valid votes. 
 
The method of estimation used in this section, as in the previous one, is transparent, 
uses the exogeneity of the terrorist attack as the fundamental identification device and it 
is based on voting behaviour, not opinions.  
Are the statistical results of this section plausible? There are several ways of arguing 
that the results in table 7 are reasonable. First, and most important, the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction effect and the results of the counterfactual calculation are 
basically in line with the evidence presented in section 3. Secondly, the results are also 
in line with the outcomes of the study by the Spanish Center of Sociological Research 
(CIS) of April 2004
36. This study concludes, from a large survey
37, that 1 million 
                                                 
36 CIS (2004) Study No 2559. 
37 The sample size is 5,377 individuals in the national sample. This post-electoral survey is not able to 
reproduce precisely the results of the actual vote. In fact, in the CIS study for each vote to the 
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people decided to vote after the terrorist attack and 1.6 million changed their vote in 
favour of the socialist party, mostly from the communist party
38. These numbers are 
close to the ones obtained by the estimation presented in table 7, providing additional 
evidence of the plausibility of the results. Finally, the counterfactual evaluation based 
no the estimators in table 7 is basically in line with the polls taken in the weeks before 
the election’s day, which is an additional indication that the estimation provides 
reasonable results.  
Another indication comes from the behaviour of the participation rates for the potential 
resident voters and registered Spanish nationals abroad. Figure 4 shows a large increase 
in the participation rate for resident voters in 2004. The increase is so large that it 
almost recovered the level of the 1996 Congressional election. The participation of 
Spanish nationals abroad is higher in 2004 than in 2000, but only very modestly and in 
line with the increase of the general participation rate expected from the polls previous 
to the terrorist attack. The results of the CIS post-electoral survey indicate that the 
influence of the terrorist attack was very important to push people to cast their vote, 
even though before the attack they had decided not to vote. Therefore, the predictable 
and very modest increase of the participation rate of Spanish nationals abroad is another 
indicator of the appropriateness of our specification. Finally, notice that the CIS survey 
points out that almost all the voters that argue that the terrorist attack was the reason to 
vote the party they decided to vote for, did so in favour of the socialist party (88%). The 
predicted vote for the conservative and the socialist party under the counterfactual is 




Could terrorist attacks be timed in order to alter the result of democratic elections? This 
paper answers this question by analyzing the effect of the 11M terrorist attacks in 
Madrid. This choice is justified by the particular circumstances that took place in that 
case, which generate the typical structure of a natural experiment.  
                                                                                                                                               
conservative party, the socialist party has 1.64 votes while in the actual voting the ratio is 1.12. However, 
notice that the Demoscopia survey, used by Lago and Montero (2005), delivers a ratio of 2 and includes a 
smaller sample (2,929) than the CIS survey. 
38 Some questions in the survey were specifically designed to measure the influence of the terrorist attack 
in the behaviour of voters.  See also Colomer (2005).  
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There is still a heated debate on the electoral effect of the 11M terrorist attacks in 
Madrid. One week before the election, opinion polls showed a clear advantage for the 
incumbent (conservative) party. After the terrorist attack, the contestant (socialist) party 
won the 2004 Congressional election. Studies, using post-electoral survey data, have 
tried to argue that the socialist party would have won the election even without the 
terrorist attack. However, the use of post-electoral survey data guarantees the wrong 
answer to the counterfactual question of what would have happened if the terrorist 
attack would not had taken place.  
Usually it is very difficult to evaluate properly the electoral effect of an episode like a 
terrorist attack. However, in this particular case, the fact that the Spanish nationals 
abroad had a deadline to vote before the bombing, generates a very special situation. We 
use this macabre natural experiment to identify the electoral effect of the 11M terrorist 
attack. Instead of using data on opinions from post-electoral polls, we only consider 
data on actual voting decisions by voters resident in Spain and citizens abroad. The 
calculations under the counterfactual of “no terrorist attack” support the forecasts of the 
polls taken previous to the terrorist attack. The incumbent (conservative) party would 
have won the election reaching a range between the 42% and the 45% of the voters, 
while the socialist party would have obtained 37% of the votes. Under these conditions 
the incumbent (conservative) party would have won the election. 
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Estimation using four Congressional elections (unweighted)
All the sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D04 -3.52 -4.58 -4.50 -4.53 -4.51 -4.56
(-4.05) (-5.27) (-2.88) (-4.81) (-2.88) (-2.90)
D00 3.24 3.18 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.15
(5.67) (5.40) (5.62) (5.54) (5.61) (5.58)
DG (treatment) -5.29 -4.90 -4.94 -4.90 -4.91 -4.91
(-5.02) (-4.60) (-3.35) (-4.33) (-3.31) (-3.25)
PART(t-1) -0.70 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(-5.56) (-0.75) (-5.14) (-0.75) (-0.70)
PART(t-1)*G 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.06) (-0.01) (-0.02)




constant 6.29 9.15 8.93 9.02 8.97 8.66
(12.93) (10.07) (2.50) (10.06) (2.50) (2.37)
R2 0.52 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
N 312 312 312 312 312 312
Counterfactual
% voters incumbent 42.8% 42.5% 42.5% 42.5% 42.5% 42.4%
The t-statistic is presented between parenthesis. The standard deviation is calculated using
a robust HAC estimator. Dependent variable is the change in the proportion of votes for the conservative
(incumbent) party in four consecutive elections. D04 and D00 are two time dummies. 
PART is the participation rate. ELEC is the number of potential voters. DG is a dummy variable
that is 1 for the treatment group after the treatment period. G is equal to 1 for the treatment group.Table 3. 
Estimation using four Congressional elections (unweighted) without outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D04 -3.81 -4.77 -4.34 -4.72 -4.37 -4.39
(-4.37) (-5.04) (-2.84) (-5.62) (-3.67) (-3.68)
D00 3.52 3.47 3.50 3.41 3.50 3.45
(6.17) (6.09) (6.17) (6.11) (6.11) (6.00)
DG (treatment) -5.60 -5.29 -5.56 -5.29 -5.52 -5.47
(-5.75) (-5.16) (-4.22) (-5.16) (-4.76) (-4.71)
PART(t-1) -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03
(-5.45) (-0.46) (-4.82) (-0.67) (-0.55)
PART(t-1)*G -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.36) (-0.41) (-0.46)




constant 6.27 8.97 7.79 8.85 7.87 7.40
(12.58) (10.04) (2.27) (9.82) (3.13) (2.89)
R2 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
N 300 300 300 300 300 300
Counterfactual
% voters incumbent 43.1% 43.1% 43.1% 42.9% 43.1% 43.0%
The t-statistic is presented between parenthesis. The standard deviation is calculated using
a robust HAC estimator. Dependent variable is the change in the proportion of votes for the conservative
(incumbent) party in four consecutive elections. D04 and D00 are two time dummies. 
PART is the participation rate. ELEC is the number of potential voters. DG is a dummy variable
that is 1 for the treatment group after the treatment period. G is equal to 1 for the treatment group.Table 4. 
Weighted regressions. Four congressional elections.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D04 -3.02 -1.42 -3.38 -1.46 -3.37 -4.26
(-2.74) (-0.70) (-1.93) (-0.75) (-1.98) (-2.33)
D00 1.44 1.41 1.35 1.42 1.36 1.35
(2.06) (2.03) (1.96) (2.14) (2.07) (2.06)
DG (treatment) -7.57 -8.93 -6.49 -8.80 -6.43 -5.53
(-7.35) (-5.04) (-4.24) (-5.03) (-4.21) (-3.30)
PART(t-1) 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.30 0.27
(0.93) (3.26) (1.24) (3.38) (3.20)
PART(t-1)*G -0.21 0.21 -0.18
(-3.89) (-3.86) (-3.60)




constant 4.04 1.75 -2.64 1.61 -2.66 -2.74
(7.63) (0.70) (-0.82) (0.68) (-0.87) (-0.89)
R2 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.8 0.81 0.81
N 312 312 312 312 312 312
The t-statistic is presented between parenthesis. The standard deviation is calculated using
a robust HAC estimator. Dependent variable is the change in the proportion of votes for the conservative
(incumbent) party in four consecutive elections. D04 and D00 are two time dummies. 
PART is the participation rate. ELEC is the number of potential voters. DG is a dummy variable
that is 1 for the treatment group after the treatment period. G is equal to 1 for the treatment group.Table 5. 
Weighted regressions without outliers. Four elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D04 -3.04 -1.26 -3.25 -1.32 -3.25 -4.10
(-2.76) (-0.62) (-1.84) (-0.68) (-1.90) (-2.26)
D00 1.46 1.43 1.37 1.44 1.37 1.37
(2.08) (2.05) (1.97) (2.17) (2.09) (2.08)
DG (treatment) -7.58 -9.10 -6.62 -8.96 -6.55 -5.62
(-7.37) (-5.16) (-4.32) (-5.12) (-4.27) (-3.34)
PART(t-1) 0.03 0.31 0.04 0.31 0.29
(1.04) (3.41) (1.34) (3.50) (3.32)
PART(t-1)*G -0.22 -0.21 -0.19
(-4.01) (-3.96) (-3.70)




constant 4.04 1.48 -3.12 1.38 -3.09 -3.17
(7.62) (0.60) (-0.97) (0.59) (-1.01) (-1.03)
R2 0.8 0.8 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82
N 300 300 300 300 300 300
The t-statistic is presented between parenthesis. The standard deviation is calculated using
a robust HAC estimator. Dependent variable is the change in the proportion of votes for the conservative
(incumbent) party in four consecutive elections. D04 and D00 are two time dummies. 
PART is the participation rate. ELEC is the number of potential voters. DG is a dummy variable
that is 1 for the treatment group after the treatment period. G is equal to 1 for the treatment group.Table 6. 
Weighted regressions. Three congressional elections.
All the sample Without outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D04 -4.46 -4.82 -5.09 -4.31 -4.61 -4.92
(-4.16) (-1.98) (-2.21) (-4.20) (-1.91) (-2.15)
DG (treatment) -7.57 -7.26 -6.92 -7.58 -7.49 -7.12
(-7.35) (-3.34) (-3.39) (-7.36) (-3.48) (-3.51)
PART(t-1) -0.006 0.00 0.00 0.02
(-0.16) (-0.03) (-0.05) (0.07)
ELEC(t-1) -0.37 -0.36
(-2.99) (-2.91)
constant 5.48 6.00 6.17 5.51 5.66 5.88
(11.88) (1.87) (2.96) (11.86) (1.79) (2.00)
R2 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87
N 208 208 208 200 200 200
The t-statistic is presented between parenthesis. The standard deviation is calculated using
a robust HAC estimator. Dependent variable is the change in the proportion of votes for the conservative
(incumbent) party in three consecutive elections. D04 is a time time dummy. 
PART is the participation rate. ELEC is the number of potential voters. DG is a dummy variable
that is 1 for the treatment group after the treatment period.